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A B S T R A C T S  A R T I C L E   I N F 
O 
Global governance in the post-COVID-19 operating 
environment faces unprecedented NTS challenges to a 
broad range of referent objects from the global 
biosphere, down through systemic security at the 
international and regional level, through national 
security, down to vulnerable individuals and groups. 
These challenges cannot be addressed successfully 
through the old state-centric mechanisms of 
international and national governance agendas and 
policy platforms. The purpose of this study is to 
assesses the future of global governance challenges in a 
world ravaged by COVID-19, and the hope offered by 
new actors in addressing these challenges. Therefore, 
the rise of new challenges has also brought new actors 
to the fore, including middle powers, IOs, NGOs, and 
other civil society organizations and entities. It is the 
very interconnectedness of the new challenges which 
empowers the new actors to contribute substantially to 
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We expect those who govern to do so 
in the interests of the governed, usefully 
providing services that can best or 
perhaps only be achieved through 
collective action. “Governance is the sum 
of the many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs” (CGG, 1995, p.2). It 
is an ongoing and evolutionary process 
which looks to reconcile conflicting 
interests in order to protect the weak, 
through the rule of law, from unjust 
exploitation, and introduce security for 
all. Governance is also a process through 
which collective good and goods are 
generated so that all are better off than 
they would be acting individually. Thus, 
governance implies a concern by those 
who govern with both the security and 
development of those who are governed 
(Howe, 2012, p.346). 
Domestically, governance is carried out 
primarily by instruments of the state, 
including the institutions of government, 
legislation, and enforcement. 
Internationally, governance implies not 
only global attempts to govern in the 
absence of world government, dealing 
with international conflicts of interests 
and those issues which transcend 
national boundaries, but also a concern 
with what can be done by international 
actors when domestic governance fails to 
provide safe havens. Thus, international 
organisation can be seen as a transitional 
process from the international anarchic 
conditions which generate conflict, 
towards the aspiration of global 
governance, whereby states are actively 
brought together to solve common 
problems, reconcile conflicting interests, 
and generate collective good, including a 
more peaceful and secure operating 
environment. 
International organisations (IOs) are 
representative aspects of the phase of that 
process which has been reached at a 
given time (Claude, 1963, p.4). These 
institutions form a key plank of the liberal 
international order, but remain 
controversial, and are increasingly 
coming under attack for their dualistic 
nature. On the one hand IOs are creations 
of the states (especially the most 
powerful) that make up their 
membership and which they serve so as 
to make the sovereign interstate system 
function better. On the other hand, IOs 
require a degree of alienation or 
transference of state sovereignty. In the 
current strategic operating environment, 
the liberal international order faces the 
challenges of United States (US) 
abdication of leadership and increasing 
contestation between the US and the 
other great powers, China and Russia. 
Furthermore, COVID-19 and 
environmental concerns, pose major 
challenges for the traditional state-centric 
models upon which much strategic 
decision-making is based (Howe 2020, 
p.18). 
Peace and security have long constituted 
the central objectives of global 
governance and form an essential 
dimension of human well-being. Indeed, 
the maintenance of international peace 
and security is listed as the first purpose 
of the United Nations (UN), the major 
manifestation of the global governance 
mission, and related aspirations feature 
heavily in the preamble to the UN Charter. 
Yet the global governance agenda has 
evolved to include consideration of peace 
within states rather than exclusively 
focusing on the generation of peace 
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between them. In doing so there has been 
movement from championing the 
interests and rights of states, towards 
championing those of vulnerable 
individuals and groups. Consequently, 
the new human-centred concerns of good 
global governance place the paradigm as 
much within the contemporary 
development agenda, as it was formerly 
within the peace and political stability 
agenda. 
Furthermore, in contemporary discourse 
and increasingly in practice, security is an 
essentially contested concept in terms of 
referent object, the scope of issues 
covered (the degree of securitization), 
and indeed within specific issues. New 
thinking on security has come to the fore, 
with input from academics, and from 
practitioners in IOs and middle-power 
states. The rise of non-traditional security 
(NTS) perspectives and ‘new security 
challenges’ have seen the broadening of 
the scope of enquiry along the x-axis of 
issues from a strict focus on national 
survival in a hostile operating 
environment and questions related to 
war and peace, to include some or all of 
the following: a focus on non-military 
rather than military threats, transnational 
rather than national threats, and 
multilateral or collective rather than self-
help security solutions (Acharya, 2002). 
Within both security and peacebuilding 
discourses, there have also been 
increasing emphases on individual 
human beings and the planet or global 
biosphere, corresponding to a bi-
directional expansion along the y-axis of 
referent objects. 
This keynote, therefore, assesses the 
future of global governance challenges in 
a world ravaged by COVID-19, and the 
hope offered by new actors in addressing 
these challenges. 
2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
UN SYSTEM 
International organisation is 
fundamentally, even though not 
exclusively, a reaction to the problem of 
war (Claud, 1963, p.219). Safeguarding 
international peace and security was the 
primary reason for the establishment of 
the UN in 1945. The aspiration “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war” appears in the opening lines of 
the UN Charter. Maintaining peace and 
security appears first in the Charter’s 
statement of purposes and principles. 
Even the roles and non-military functions 
of IOs dealing with other aspects of 
global governance are often justified by 
the contributions they can make to 
international peace and security. The 
institutionalisation of multilateral 
security cooperation at the global level, 
under first the League of Nations (albeit a 
false dawn), and more recently and 
successfully, the UN system, has 
contributed significantly to the resolution 
of existing conflicts and the generation of 
a more peaceful international society. 
The global governance aspiration 
represented here is for a system of 
collective conflict management (CCM). 
This has been defined as a pattern of 
group action, usually but not necessarily 
sanctioned by a global or regional body, 
in anticipation of, or in response to the 
outbreak of intra- or interstate armed 
conflict, including any systemic effort to 
prevent, suppress, or reverse breaches of 
the peace where states are acting beyond 
the scope of specific alliances (Lepgold 
and Weiss, 1998, p.5). Implicit in this 
description is the concept of automatic 
response to breaches of the peace, which 
is the foundation of the principle of 
collective security underpinning both the 
League of Nations and the UN. 





Under such systemic security conditions, 
peace is seen as being indivisible, and an 
attack on one is regarded as an attack on 
all. If all acknowledge and commit to a 
duty to come to the aid of any victim of 
aggression, and punish the aggressor, 
regardless of the identity of either, peace 
ensues from the rational impossibility of 
any one state winning a war against all 
others. Furthermore, rule utilitarian 
evaluation of the benefits of a peaceful 
operating environment versus the costs 
of a Hobbesian war of all-against-all, 
makes it rational for all to sign up to such 
a regime, even if, at times, based on 
simple utility, defection would seem to be 
the dominant strategy. 
Yet many contemporary threats to 
national and international systemic 
security do not lend themselves to the 
machinations of state-centric rational 
payoffs, revolving as they do around 
trans-state or sub-state issues such as 
climate change, environmental 
degradation, pandemics (including 
COVID-19), refugee flows and forced 
migration, poverty and distributive 
injustices, and natural and, given the role 
of human agency, nature-induced 
disasters. These new security challenges 
and NTS issues threaten national and 
international/systemic security, but they 
also threaten the security of vulnerable 
human beings and groups, individually 
and collectively (Freedman and Murphy, 
2018, pp.1-5). Hence it is important to go 
beyond simple security analysis when 
looking at global governance challenges, 
but also international governance 
responses. 
The UN system was, in fact, founded on 
three governance pillars: security, 
development, and human rights (as 
shown in Figure 1), and the new human-
centered governance agendas, which 
have dramatically come to the fore in the 
post-Cold War operating environment 
can be found at their intersection. 
 
Fig. 1. The Three Pillars of UN 
Governance 
Chiefly, at the level of academic 
discourse, as well as increasingly in the 
policy sphere, this humanising of 
measurements of governance success 
reflects what has come to be known as 
‘human security,’ wherein the referent 
object which governance actors are trying 
to protect from existential threat shifts 
from the state and/or interstate system to 
providing vulnerable individuals and 
groups with safe havens free from fear 
and want. Policy prescriptions made 
under the dictates of this paradigm reflect 
both normative concerns (that governing 
in the interests of the most vulnerable is 
fundamentally the ‘right’ thing to do) and 
those of efficacy (that other governance 
objectives are more achievable if 
individuals and groups are taken into 
account). 
Human security is a multi-disciplinary 
paradigm for understanding global 
vulnerabilities at the level of individual 
human beings. It incorporates 
methodologies and analysis from a 
number of research fields including 
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development studies, human rights, 
international relations, and the study of 
international organisations. It exists at the 
point where these disciplines converge 
on the concept of protection. The IOs of 
the UN system have been at the forefront 
of the development and propagation of 
the paradigm. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)’s 
“Human Development Report 1994: New 
Dimensions of Human Security” is seen 
as the prime foundational document for 
the global governance mission with 
regard to human security. The report 
noted that the objective of security has 
changed from states to human beings, 
with a need for a more human-centric 
approach to security, and a recognition 
that freedom from want and freedom 
from fear constitute important 
perspectives on poverty and 
development (UNDP, 1994). Indeed, 
there is a close relationship between 
human security envisioned as the 
protection of persons, and human 
development as the provision of basic 
human needs. 
Human security and human 
development are both people-centred 
(Peou, 2014). They challenge the 
orthodox approach to security and 
development (i.e., state security and 
liberal economic growth respectively). 
Both perspectives are multidimensional, 
and address people’s dignity as well as 
their material and physical concerns. 
Both impose duties on the wider global 
community. They can be seen as 
mutually reinforcing. A peaceful 
environment frees individuals and 
governments to move from a focus on 
mere survival to a position where they 
can consider improvement of their 
situations. Likewise, as a society 
develops, it is able to afford more doctors, 
hospitals, welfare networks, internal 
security operations, schools, and de-
mining operations. Conversely, as 
observed by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, “we will not enjoy 
security without development, 
development without security, and 
neither without respect for human rights. 
Unless all these causes are advanced, 
none will succeed” (Annan, 2005, p.6). 
Conflict retards development, and 
underdevelopment can lead to conflict. 
Figure 2 below models the evolution of 
global governance perspectives on 
security and development to take into 
account the demands of vulnerable 
individuals and groups. 
 
Fig. 2. The evolution of global 
governance perspectives 
3. CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
The two most pressing contemporary 
global governance challenges are both 
related to NTS perspectives, as they are 
impervious to state-centric rationales and 
policy prescriptions, and they pose an 
existential threat to all. 
First, environmental security is a policy 
area in which all the classes of political 
actor interact; both affected by and able to 
affect significant elements of the 


































































absolute terms (the biosphere is 
increasingly endangered by human 
activity), relative terms (when compared 
with other security conceptualizations), 
and academic terms. Policy options and 
implications are increasingly cross-
border or global and are not amenable to 
rational actor model (RAM) pressures 
such as defense, deterrence, 
appeasements, inducements, or collective 
security. Rather than the tit-for-tat nature 
of traditional security interactions, 
environmental security is best modeled 
by the game theoretical model of a 
‘tragedy of the commons,’ whereby if 
each actor pursues their narrow selfish 
interests it will result in catastrophe for 
all. 
From a global governance perspective, 
the UN has launched multiple initiatives, 
but remains challenged in its aspirations 
by the legacies of traditional national 
security and national interest 
considerations. These include the 1972 
UN Conference on the Human 
environment in Stockholm which 
contributed publicity, a declaration on 
principles, an action plan of 
recommendations, and a resolution on 
institutional and financial arrangements. 
The Stockholm declaration established 
limitations to sovereignty, noted duties 
incumbent on state actors, as well as the 
common heritage of mankind’s 
resources. It also established monitoring 
networks, created the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
serve as a propagation and 
organizational framework, and 
stimulated NGOs and individual 
governments to act. 
This was followed by the Brundtland 
Commission which introduced the 
concept of sustainable development; the 
1987 Montreal Protocol addressing ozone 
depletion; the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio which launched the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCC); the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol which extended the 
UNFCCC with more stringent measures; 
and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which was 
an agreement within the UNFCCC, 
dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions 
mitigation, adaptation, and finance. 
The environmental security paradigm 
has created lots of awareness, some 
government, IO and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) action, but not 
enough enforcement or binding 
mechanisms. It has substantially been 
challenged by the unilateral policy 
prescriptions and rejection of obligations 
by the dominant states in the system, 
with the US, China, Russia, as well as 
second-tier great powers India and 
Brazil, all ranking as major contributors 
to climate change. Furthermore, the 
world hegemonic leader, the US, has 
actively obstructed the evolution of the 
governance paradigm by withdrawing 
from the above-mentioned international 
instruments (albeit that the incoming 
administration of President-Elect Biden 
has indicated it will rejoin). 
Meanwhile, in trying to coordinate a 
global response to COVID-19 (and other 
pandemics), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) finds itself at the 
centre of the dualistic paradox of 
international organization. The responses 
of the three great powers (the US, China, 
and Russia) to the COVID-19 crisis, as 
well as those of some second-tier powers 
such as the United Kingdom (UK), Brazil, 
and India, also leave much to be desired 
in terms of both international and 
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domestic leadership. Indeed, policies in 
these countries contribute overall to the 
challenges faced by the WHO, rather than 
providing adequate support for the 
organization to carry out its global 
governance and systemic health security 
mission (Howe 2020, p.18). 
Lack of transparency and freedom of 
information and speech in China allowed 
pandemics to spread, and critically 
endangered vulnerable individuals and 
groups in the country, the region, and 
across the globe. When the Chinese 
government has acted, it has been 
unilaterally, and in an authoritarian 
manner rather than openness, imposing 
comprehensive lockdowns which 
exacerbated socio-economic 
vulnerabilities. By contrast, agents of 
governance in the US during the current 
COVID-19 pandemic were slow to 
respond to the pandemic initially out of 
concern for the impact restrictions would 
have upon civil liberties and individual 
freedoms, and later, due to concerns for 
the economic impacts. These have also 
provided the pressures for premature 
lifting of restrictions. As a result, the US 
is now the most severely impacted 
country in the world. Internationally, 
China and the US have focused on 
blaming each other for the impact of 
COVID-19, resorting to national interest 
security promotion rather than collective 
action, and showing inconsistent support 
for the mission of the WHO, and even 
outright hostility. 
The problems faced by the organization 
in carrying out its global health 
governance mission resulting from great 
power obstruction were initially 
highlighted by the 2002-2004 SARS 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) outbreak. 
SARS-CoV first infected humans in the 
Guangdong province of southern China 
in 2002, rapidly turned into a pandemic 
which affected 26 countries and resulted 
in more than 8000 cases in 2003, before 
dying out with only a small number of 
cases in 2004 (WHO, 2020a). The Chinese 
authorities were initially unwilling to 
cooperate with the WHO due to 
considerations of national interest and 
state sovereignty. As was also the case 
with the Hong Kong authorities where 
the disease soon spread, lack of 
epidemiological information about the 
disease hampered the prompt application 
of effective control measures, and 
because of inadequate communication, 
“panic developed in the community and 
weakened cooperation and support from 
the public” (Hung, 2003, p.376). 
During the current crisis, the WHO once 
again must face an uncooperative great 
power, but this time it is the hegemon 
working against the global governance 
mission. On May 29, 2020, President 
Donald Trump said he would make good 
on his threat to withdraw from the WHO, 
“an unprecedented move that could 
undermine the global coronavirus 
response and make it more difficult to 
stamp out other disease threats” (Ehley & 
Ollstein, 2020). The US gave $893 million 
to WHO from 2018-2019, of which $237 
million were assessed contributions, but 
still owes approximately $392 million 
through various multiyear cooperative 
agreements (Liberman, 2020). 
By far the largest state donor to the 
organization, US conflict with the WHO 
could have a devastating impact on the 
latter’s global health governance mission 
(albeit again with the caveat that a new 
administration in Washington may bring 
new policies). 








Despite remaining distinct in terms of 
focus and referent objects, there is a close 
relationship between traditional and NTS 
approaches, and considerable spillover 
between them. The negative 
consequences of conflictual operating 
environments and relationships can spill 
over both downwards from international 
and national insecurities to human 
vulnerabilities, and in the opposite 
direction. National insecurity can divert 
resources from human development, 
distort budgetary allocations, leaving 
little for human-centered development 
and resilience building, and exacerbate 
both distributive injustice and 
environmental degradation. On the other 
hand, human insecurity can lead a group 
of victims to take refuge in a neighboring 
country, impacting upon the latter’s 
security conditions. Furthermore, those 
refugees may regroup and undermine the 
security of those who forced them to flee. 
Lack of food or energy can undermine 
national cohesion and weaken national 
strength, increasing national insecurity, 
or likewise lead to trans-border 
migration. 
Environmental degradation can also 
pose national security challenges through 
the intervening variables of human 
insecurity and climate refugees. Health 
crises impact the socio-economically 
most vulnerable populations with the 
greatest severity, as has been seen during 
the COVID-19 pandemic mortality rates. 
Thus, poverty serves as a health 
insecurity multiplier. At the same time, 
COVID-19, and government responses to 
it, have served as a poverty multiplier, 
thrusting many more into conditions of 
human insecurity in terms of lack of 
freedom from want. 
Despite clearer skies and waterways as a 
result of the lockdown, potentially 
leading to fewer deaths as a result of 
environmental health issues, researchers 
are now uncovering a link between 
pollution and the severity of the impact of 
the disease. Furthermore, concerns are 
emerging over the huge amount of non-
biodegradable waste being produced, 
used, and discarded, in terms of masks 
and PPE. Finally, the poor are most 
vulnerable to the consequences of 
environmental degradation, poverty 
often precludes sustainable development 
practices, and natural disasters are 
exacerbated by environmental 
degradation. Thus, vicious cycles of 
insecurity exist beyond the reach of state-
centric security models and 
policymaking. Table 1 reviews the 
different types of security addressed by 
global governance in terms of referent 
objects and the growing number of 
security issues
 
Table 1. Levels of security/insecurity and existential threats 















Defense, deterrence, balance of 
power 
9 | International Journal of Computer in Law & Political Science 1 (2020) 9-20 
 

















Water, food, environmental hazards, 
“natural” disasters, energy, terrorism, 
international crime 

















Climate change, global warming, 
sustainability, the Anthropocene, 
biodiversity, the global commons, 
pollution, consumption, pandemics, 
legal personality. 










Explosive remnants of war (ERW), 
responsibility to protect (R2P), 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs), 
humanitarian intervention 
shelter, food, water, stability, 
sustainability, “nature-induced” 
disasters, conflict transformation 
5. SOURCES OF HOPE 
First, there is a growing recognition of 
the interdependencies between these 
levels and issues of security, and the 
challenges they pose to all who govern, as 
well as the global nature of their 
existential threats. In order to break these 
vicious cycles of insecurity spillover, 
resilient communities must be 
constructed, and they must be built from 
the bottom up in harmony with local 
values and nature and in a spirit of 
international cooperation and global 
management of the commons, rather than 
the top down and imposed through 
national security and development policy 
platforms, which focus on the 
domination of nature. In other words, a 
focus on how to bring people 
constructively together to build a whole 
greater than the sum of the parts, rather 
than on how to keep them apart in order 
to mitigate against the worst 
manifestations of conflicts of interests. 
Second, even the great powers seem to be 
increasingly willing to play by the rules 
of global governance, with a Biden 
Administration in the US showing a 
willingness to rejoin the instruments of 
global governance, and China showing 
greater responsibility and a willingness 
to cooperate on pandemic management 
while also aiming for carbon neutrality 
by 2060. There has been a gradual 
recognition that doing the normatively 
right thing can also be in the strategic 
national interest of powerful 
international actors. 
Third, middle powers and civil society 
organizations are increasingly taking the 
initiative in human-centric global 
governance. Middle powers lack 
‘compulsory power;’ the military 





resources to dominate other countries or 
the economic resources to bribe them. Yet 
they differ from the small or ‘system 
ineffectual’ states which have little or no 
influence, being, potentially, ‘system 
affecting states’ with significant impact 
within a narrower policy area, or in 
conjunction with others (Vom Hau, Scott, 
and Hulme, 2012, pp.187-8). To maximize 
their relevance and impact, a degree of 
selectivity on the part of these middle 
powers is required. This means the 
pursuit of ‘niche diplomacy,’ which 
involves concentrating resources in 
specific areas best able to generate returns 
worth having, rather than trying to cover 
the field, allowing them, therefore, to 
‘punch above their weight’ (Henrikson, 
2005, 67). Increasingly, middle powers 
have found their ‘niches’ in the 
promotion of cooperative governance 
networks of NTS and human-centered 
policy-making. 
Middle powers and their civil societies, in 
particular those in the Asia-Pacific 
region, including the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), Taiwan, Vietnam, and New 
Zealand, have received glowing 
evaluations for their responses, and also 
for their support of multilateral health 
governance efforts and the WHO. While 
the US may be the largest donor, the top 
ten is rounded out by three middle 
powers in the UK, Germany, and Japan; 
four civil society organizations--the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the GAVI 
Alliance, Rotary International, and the 
National Philanthropic Trust; and two 
IOs in the United Nations (UN) Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA), and the European 
Commission (WHO, 2020b). 
In terms of Core Voluntary Contributions 
(CVC), which are fully unconditional 
(flexible), meaning the WHO has full 
discretion on how these funds should be 
used to fund the programmatic work of 
the Organization, the dominance of small 
and medium-ranked powers, as well as 
civil society organizations, is even more 
stark. In order of support, we find the UK, 
Sweden, Norway, Australia, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, France, the 
Estate of Mrs. Edith Christina Ferguson, 
Spain, the Estate of the Late Marjory 
Miller Thompson, Monaco, and 
Miscellaneous (ibid.). 
At the same time, the ROK has been at the 
forefront of ‘green growth’ initiatives. 
President Lee Myung-bak founded the 
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 
2010, and this was later converted into an 
international treaty-based organization 
in 2012 at the Rio+20 Summit. In January 
of the same year, the GGGI, the OECD, 
the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank 
signed an MOU to formally launch the 
Green Growth Knowledge Platform 
(GGKP) to enhance and expand efforts to 
identify and address major knowledge 
gaps in green growth theory and practice, 
and to help countries design and 
implement policies to move towards a 
green economy. The UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (UNSDGs) and their 
evolution through successive 
international fora, represent further 
opportunities for Korea to continue its 
previously successful niche diplomacy 
and agenda setting in these fields. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Global governance in the post-
COVID-19 operating environment faces 
unprecedented NTS challenges to a broad 
range of referent objects from the global 
biosphere, down through systemic 
security at the international and regional 
level, through national security, down to 
vulnerable individuals and groups. These 
challenges cannot be addressed 
successfully through the old state-centric 
mechanisms of international and national 
governance agendas and policy 
platforms. Furthermore, NTS and 
traditional security conceptualizations 
interact in a complex web of causality. 
Nevertheless, the rise of new 
challenges has also brought new actors to 
the fore, including middle powers, IOs, 
NGOs, and other civil society 
organizations and entities. It is the very 
interconnectedness of the new challenges 
which empowers the new actors to 
contribute substantially to global 
governance in theory and practice. 
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